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11 Introduction
The process of economic integration is ongoing if not accelerating during the
last decade. The enlargement of regional integration blocks (NAFTA, EU,
and others) and global tari⁄ reductions, as for example the WTO Uruguay
round negotiated, are supposed to stimulate growth and wealth in the con-
tributing countries. One of the channels through which economic integration
a⁄ects growth is that openness to international competition leads to e¢ -
cient resource reallocation and structural and technological change. While
the factor reallocation tends to increase overall productivity with positive
welfare e⁄ects, this process generates costs for workers undergoing a la-
bor turnover when their former employments fall victim to the structural
change caused by the removal of former protectionism. Haltiwanger et al.
(2004) and Ribeiro et al. (2004) show in their empirical studies that trade
liberalization indeed increased the pace of labor reallocation with negative
employment e⁄ects in Latin America and Brazil respectively.
The main argument for economic integration is that it opens up pro-
ductivity potentials through e¢ cient resource reallocation or international
technology spillovers. Models of growth through innovation in the tradition
of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) show that a high degree of free technology
exchange between the economies leads to high rates of economic growth as
integrated economies enlarge the scope of available R&D products. The pos-
itive e⁄ect of openness on innovation and productivity growth is supported
by empirical studies. For example, Keller (2002) concludes that R&D con-
ducted abroad contributes up to 20 per cent to productivity increases in
home industries.
However, the e⁄ects of economic integration on technological change
are mixed if we consider economies with structural di⁄erences. Economic
integration may enlarge those di⁄erences as it generates resource reallocation
in the economies. Depending on the initial resource allocation, it might
then occur that one country specializes in the highly productive, the other
one in the low productive industry. This implies less growth prospects for
the poorer economy. See, for example, the contributions by Grossman and
2Helpman (1990), Rivera-Batiz and Xie (1993), and Feenstra (1996).
Other negative consequences of economic integration can arise in the
labor market. Economic integration with skill-biased e⁄ects may result in
wage inequality (Bretschger, 1997), unemployment (Davis, 1998), or both
(‚ Sener, 2001). Unemployment arises in these models if institutions, such as
unions, minimum wages etc., make wages rigid.1 This paper adds to the lit-
erature the case that, even without the skill-bias and with similar developed
countries, economic integration leads to structural change and labor real-
location. The direction we consider in the relationship between economic
integration and labor reallocation is that openness a⁄ects endogenous job
creation and job destruction. Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) and
Davidson and Matusz (2005) explore the implications of the reverse approach
from turnover to trade, which explains trade patters and export rates as a
result of exogenously-given cross-sector di⁄erences in labor turnover. De-
spite the exogeneity of labor reallocation rates, their model suggests e⁄ects
of trade on unemployment. With di⁄erent search technologies in di⁄erent
sectors, sectoral shifts due to free trade may increase aggregate unemploy-
ment if a country has a comparative advantage in producing the good of
the high-unemployment sector. This paper considers sectoral shifts under
a di⁄erent focus, which is their e⁄ects on technological change and growth.
This has as one implication that, if there is a negative e⁄ect of economic
integration on employment, the stimulation of growth through economic
integration reduces.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate interactions between unem-
ployment and growth in an open economy. We construct a two-sector, two-
country model in which growth is driven by home and foreign R&D. Via
labor reallocation, technological change has e⁄ects on the employment and
the unemployment levels.2 The modelling of the paper combines endoge-
1 There are alternative approaches to introduce unemployment into trade models. For
example, Matusz (1996, 1998) shows that unemployment due to e¢ ciency wages may
decline if economic integration raises real wages.
2 The analysis of technological change in a matching model of unemployment goes back
to Pissarides (2000) and Aghion and Howitt (1994). In a more micro-level approach,
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) show on which condition technological progress results
in more labor reallocation in combination with an increase in unemployment.
3nous innovation of the type developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992) with
a vintage-separated manufacturing sector, in which di⁄erences in relative
productivity lead to labor reallocation from old to new vintages. Economic
integration tends to stimulate innovations and increases the extent of labor
reallocation at the same time. On condition that frictions hinder job cre-
ation, unemployment occurs as a symptom of economic integration. The
analysis shows that this e⁄ect is strong in highly protective economies and
in those countries that are highly engaged in R&D. Caused by a fall in
employment, the stimulating e⁄ects of openness on growth can disappear.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model with
endogenous innovation and explains how this is related to job destruction
and job creation. Section 3 shows the equilibrium labor allocation with
unemployment. In section 4, we present the e⁄ects of economic integration.
Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The model analyzes the interaction between technological change and la-
bor reallocation. From this we will derive how economic integration a⁄ects
growth and employment. We construct a two-sector model with R&D and
manufacturing. Equilibrium growth is driven only by new technologies de-
veloped in R&D of the two considered economies. According to the two-
country analysis, we henceforth distinct variables for country j 2 [h;f],
where h denotes the home country and f the foreign one. To keep the
exposition simple, we refer to the home country if no subscript occurs.
We consider economies populated by a mass Lj of in￿nite living individ-
uals. The individuals are endowed with one unit of labor which they supply
inelastically. Accordingly, Lj equals the total labor supply in country j.
Labor is employed in either manufacturing or R&D. Alternatively, workers
can be unemployed. Labor allocation and the employment level depend on
relative income opportunities and the extent of restrictions on job creation.
Both will be derived in the remainder of the section.
42.1 Technological Progress
Technological progress is the only source of equilibrium growth. At any time
t, R&D in both countries forms new technologies and shifts the national
frontier technology ￿max
j;t . As soon as a research unit develops an innovation






. Hence, the span of the interval increases over
time. Technological progress evolves productivity gains and the embodied
productivity level A￿ increases with any subsequent technology by a factor
￿:
A￿ = ￿A￿￿1: (1)
Technological progress spreads out the productivity gains of innovations
within a country and across the borders. However institutional or tech-
nological barriers may prevent innovations from a full di⁄usion. Let ￿j;j
denote the degree of free technology exchange, where ￿h;h = ￿f;f = 1 and
0 ￿ ￿h;f;￿f;h ￿ 1. While the access to home technologies at home is unre-
stricted, di⁄usion barriers, such as tari⁄s, restrict the ￿ ows across borders
and partly exclude foreign innovations. Hence, ￿h;f measures the share
of foreign innovative technologies which are available at home (and ￿f;h
for the other way around). The rage is between the closed economy case,
￿h;f;￿f;h = 0; and the fully integrated economy, ￿h;f;￿f;h = 1.
The total number of R&D units which undertake research at home and
abroad is LR;h+LR;f. Each unit has a Poisson-distributed arrival rate "j of
being the next innovator. As we allow for structural di⁄erences, productivity
of R&D may be di⁄erent in the two economies, i.e. "h 7 "f. A high
"j may be an indicator for a high level of economic development if, for
example, the quality of the educational system and public institutions a⁄ect
the productivity of research. The number of R&D units weighted at their
research productivity implies that the productivity of the current frontier
technology is expected to increase by a factor ￿"hLR;h+￿h"fLR;f during a
time unit. Accordingly, we can de￿ne the rate of technological progress gA;t,





Technological progress3 is endogenous as the size of the R&D sector in terms
of sector employment, LR;j, will result from the equilibrium labor allocation
between R&D and manufacturing. This is subject to the relative income
opportunities of manufacturing and R&D, depending also on foreign demand
and foreign competition, and will be analyzed next.
2.2 The Final Good Production
Firms in the manufacturing sector demand technologies and labor. They
use the inputs to produce the homogenous ￿nal good in a set of di⁄erent
vintages. The used technology ￿ de￿nes the vintage and, hence, ￿ denotes
both the technology and the related vintage in manufacturing. As tech-
nologies are di⁄erent, relative productivity a￿ = A￿=A￿max
t varies among
the vintages. Relative productivity is equal to unity in ￿max
t and lower in all
other vintages. Once foreign or home R&D supplies a new technology, a new
vintage ￿max
t in manufacturing is created. The new vintage chooses the cur-
rent maximum technology but no updating is possible afterwards. The ￿xed
vintage technology implies a relative productivity loss, namely a￿ declines,
as soon as a new technology with a higher productivity is implemented in
manufacturing.
Two steps are necessary to manufacture the ￿nal good Y . First, labor
transforms an intermediate good into a useful input for production. The
transformation of the intermediate good follows a simple linear technology4
in which one employee transforms a fraction 1=￿ of one unit of the inter-
mediate good x￿. This connects the two inputs in manufacturing simply as
3 Growth rates and therefore technology levels can diverge between the two economies. For
simplicity, we assume that an innovation introduces the ￿￿times higher productivity level
independent of the current level of A￿;j. This guarantees a mutual technology exchange
where both countries bene￿t from foreign R&D.






In the second step, the ￿nal good is created from the transformed interme-
diate good at a decreasing rate of return ￿. The production occurs with




All vintages in the interval [0;￿max
t ] contribute to the production of total




The demand for the intermediate good and labor in manufacturing result
from pro￿t maximization. A vintage earns a ￿ ow of pro￿ts ￿M;￿. Revenues
follow from the production function. The related costs arise from the input
of the intermediate good. They are composed of the corresponding price p￿
paid to the intermediate good supplier and, in addition to this, the com-
plementary labor costs as a factor ￿ of the wage rate w￿. The consequent
pro￿t equation is:
￿M;￿ = A￿x￿
￿ ￿ (p￿ + ￿w￿)x￿: (5)
The maximization of (5) over x￿ yields as a ￿rst-order condition the demand




















It varies with relative productivity how much of the intermediate good and
labor ￿rms demand. A highly productive technology, namely a high a￿,
7implies c.p. a high demand for the inputs.
Given the technology level, input demand depends on p￿ andw￿. While
the price of the intermediate good is conditional on pro￿t maximization
of the monopolistic intermediate good supplier (see the following section),
wages are set subject to average productivity in manufacturing. In contrast
to the technology di⁄erences, the wage distribution is usually compressed
and, for simplicity, we thus assume that all manufacturing workers obtain
the same wage w￿. The wage rate is ￿xed in such a way that the wage
equals a share ￿ of the revenues of vintage e ￿ which has the average relative
productivity e a. This yields:







Average relative productivity and labor input are constant. Therefore, wages
increase over time with A￿max
t at the rate gA:
Finally, we set that manufacturing ￿rms earn zero pro￿ts. Market entry
with the emergence of a new vintage is associated with the implementation
of the current leading technology. Suppose that this is accompanied by the
payment of ￿xed costs F￿. The manufacturing sector is competitive and this




e￿r(t￿￿ t)￿M;￿;tdt = F￿.
2.3 R&D and the Intermediate Good Production
Home R&D units and those abroad produce intermediate goods and develop
innovations as superior technologies, which provide the intermediate good
with a higher productivity level A￿. Various R&D units compete in the
development of the next innovation. As soon as an innovator appears with
a new maximum technology ￿max
t , the corresponding R&D unit sells the
innovation in form of intermediate goods to the manufacturing sector. The
￿ ow of pro￿ts, earned from selling the intermediate good, determines the
value of an innovation. This value then yields the return to labor of an R&D
unit, which is the alternative income to the wage rate in manufacturing.
8The R&D units produce the intermediate good at c￿ = cA￿ marginal
costs, which are proportional to the technology level. As soon as an innova-
tion arises the previous technology becomes common knowledge and di⁄erent
￿rms compete in the supply of the intermediate good so that they set price
equal to marginal costs c￿. Hence, no pro￿ts arise for these intermediate
good suppliers.
However, only the innovator has the knowledge about the leading tech-
nology ￿max
t . Hence, there is no competition in the supply of technology
￿max
t and its supplier earns monopolistic pro￿ts. The innovator replaces the
previous monopoly and then sets the pro￿t-maximizing price and output.
Pro￿ts of the R&D unit therefore arise from serving the vintage with the
highest technology level ￿max
t at home and the vintage ￿max













The monopoly chooses the pro￿t-maximizing quantity of output and
sets the corresponding p￿max
t ;j. The R&D unit faces the inverse demand
functions p￿max
t ;j = ￿A￿max
t ;jx￿￿1
￿max
t ;j ￿ ￿w￿;j of the home and foreign manu-
facturing vintage ￿max
t , which result from the demand function (6). With
this expression for p￿max
t , the ￿rst-order condition of the maximization pro-
gram max￿R;￿max
t over x￿max










where ! = w￿max=A￿max denotes the productivity-adjusted wage. The cor-













The monopolist takes a mark-up to marginal costs according to the price
elasticity of demand and a term that indicates the complementarity between
9labor and the intermediate good so that high wages corresponds to a high
price of the intermediate good.
The optimal quantity of output and its corresponding price determine
how much the R&D unit earns as long as it can realize the monopolistic
pro￿ts. However, the value of an innovation is less than the in￿nite ￿ ow of
pro￿ts. Competitors undertake R&D and will therefore replace the incum-
bent at some stage. This means that the ￿ ow of pro￿ts immediately stops
as soon as the next innovation has been developed. This emerges stochasti-
cally at probability "j per labor unit in a number of
P
j=h;f LR;j R&D units
which employ one worker each. Thus, the expected present value J￿ of an
innovation takes account of the ￿ ow of pro￿ts and the probability of a total
loss of the asset. This leads to the following asset equation




which indicates that the investment in R&D must bring the same expected
returns as the investment in an alternative asset whose return is the constant
interest rate r. Rearranging the asset equation, together with the pro￿t
equation (9) and the values p￿max
t ;j and x￿max
t ;j; then yields the expression




















One can see that the expected return from home R&D is low if foreign
competitors are strong in terms of market access ￿h;j, productivity "j, or
pure scale LR;j. On the other hand, foreign demand for the intermediate
good leads to a higher expected income from home R&D. The relative e⁄ect
of openness, namely ￿h;f;￿f;h > 0, on the returns from home R&D depends
on whether the competition or the demand e⁄ect dominates. If ￿j;j are
variable, the countries can partly control the pro￿tability of home R&D as
long as the foreign country does not respond counteractively. Moreover, the
value of an innovation is a function of time as it depends on the technology
10levels A￿max
t which increase over time. From this it follows that J￿ increases
proportional to A￿max
t ;j at the rate of technological progress.
2.4 Technology Obsolescence and Labor Reallocation
The next step is to introduce technological obsolescence as the source of
job destruction and job creation to consider labor reallocation as the factor
that determines the level of employment. Economic integration may have
an e⁄ect on labor reallocation. This occurs via structural change in manu-
facturing when labor has to be reallocated from old to new vintages. In case
of frictions in the reallocation, e.g. caused by the wage setting, the number
of vacancies in new manufacturing ￿rms deviates from the number of job
seekers due to the dismissals in old vintages and unemployment occurs.
Technological progress creates new vintages in manufacturing and re-
sults in the disappearance of old ones. After their emergence, vintages face
a gradual technological obsolescence. Technological obsolescence is accom-
panied by job destruction as older vintages are less productive and labor
demand declines with a fall in relative productivity (see equation (7)). Only
a share of the workers smaller than one remains employed in vintage ￿ as
soon as the next innovation increases the maximum productivity by a factor
￿ and reduces relative productivity of all other technologies from the prior
a￿ to a￿=￿. Let ￿ denote the ratio of employees in a vintage after and before
the next innovation occurs. Then divide the labor demand LM;￿(￿￿=￿) by








Consequently, as soon as the next innovation emerges, a share 1 ￿ ￿ of the
current number of manufacturing workers loses their jobs due to a gradual
technological obsolescence and 1 ￿ ￿ represents the rate of job destruction.
The full dimension of job destruction is equal to the share 1 ￿ ￿ of the
current jobs in manufacturing. This number of jobs yields from total labor
supply minus unemployed minus workers in the R&D sector. With u as the




￿h;j"jLR;j. Therefore, technology obsolescence causes




[￿h;j"jLR;j](1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ u)Lh ￿ LR;h] (15)
The emergence of a new vintage in the manufacturing sector creates
new jobs. The new vintage ￿max
t arises in manufacturing as soon as the
corresponding innovative technology is developed. This vintage aims to em-
ploy workers in order to start production. Therefore, it opens vacancies
and, thereby, generates new labor demand. How many vacancies are cre-
ated follows from the input demand and monopolistic pro￿t-maximization
speci￿ed in the description of the intermediate good production. The op-
timal supply of the intermediate good which embodies the technology up-
date has been shown in (10). Labor demand is a fraction ￿ of this num-





1￿￿, which is equal
to the number of vacancies the vintage o⁄ers. Obviously, a high wage
rate in terms of ! reduces vacancies. As an alternative expression one
can write vacancies as a fraction of total employment in manufacturing.
Let denote the constant ratio of labor demand of the non-leading vintages






t . The total la-
bor demand of the non-leading vintages is the sum of vintage labor de-




a=0 [a￿=(c + ￿!)]
1
1￿￿ or LM ￿ LM;￿max
t = ￿LM;￿max
t .





vacancies. This number is equal to job creation if the all vacancies can be
￿lled. The number of job-worker matches may be smaller than V if there
are frictions in the reallocation process. For example, ￿rms cannot ￿ll some
of the vacancies if labor is heterogenous and some job seekers represent non-
suitable skills. Let ￿ denote the share of non-￿lled vacancies as a measure
12of the frictions. Then, the actual number of matches M = min[(1 ￿ ￿)V;U]
yields the extent of job creation as job creation is the minimum of either the
number of ￿lled vacancies or the number of job seekers.
2.5 Perfect and Restricted Labor Reallocation
The continuous reallocation of labor with job destruction and job creation
characterizes the labor market. The labor ￿ ows generated by the realloca-
tion are into and out of employment5 and must be equal in equilibrium. As
the size of R&D and manufacturing in terms of sectoral employment LR and
LM a⁄ect the extent of job destruction U and the posting of vacancies V ,
we must ￿nd an equilibrium intersectoral labor allocation which evens out
di⁄erences between U and job creation of M = (1 ￿ ￿)V . Possibly, the bal-
ance between the two ￿ ows is accompanied by unemployment. Depending
on whether the value of U or (1 ￿ ￿)V is smaller, we obtain a regime with
perfect labor reallocation or restricted job creation.
(I) Perfect labor reallocation: Uju=0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)V
In this regime job destruction is in any case lower than the number of new
employment opportunities. Job destruction is at its maximum if all work-
ers in the labor force are in jobs, denoted with Uju=0. This is because
dismissals due to the gradual technological obsolescence a⁄ect a ￿xed pro-
portion of manufacturing workers and, hence, this number is maximum in
case of full employment. From reversal conclusion follows that full employ-
ment is guaranteed only if job creation can compensate for the maximum
extent of job destruction, Uju=0. Accordingly, if Uju=0 is smaller or equal to
(1 ￿ ￿)V , the number of destroyed jobs faces an equal number of newly ￿lled
vacancies and dismissed workers immediately re-enter new jobs. No unem-
ployment occurs but if Uju=0 < (1 ￿ ￿)V some vacancies remain un￿lled
and the number of matches is restricted by the job seekers (M = Uju=0).
(II) Restricted job creation: (1 ￿ ￿)V < Uju=0
5 Further moves in the interim are possible between manufacturing and R&D but we exclude
the entry of unemployed into R&D.
13In this regime job creation in terms of ￿lled vacancies in the new vintage
in manufacturing, is lower than than maximum job destruction of Uju=0.
Hence, this scenario is incompatible with full employment as in this case job
destruction would exceed job creation. Due to a relative lack of vacancies,
job creation can be equal to job destruction only if it is lower than maxi-
mum. As job destruction is proportional to employment, set U = (1 ￿ ￿)V
and use (15) and (16) to see that equilibrium ￿ ows of job destruction and
job creation correspond to the occurrence of unemployment














￿h;j"jLR;j indicate high job destruction. A small V and large
frictions ￿ are signs of low job creation. Both high job destruction and low
job creation increase the extent of equilibrium unemployment. Equation (17)
can also be written as uL = L￿LR ￿(M= Uju=0)LM. Only if M = Uju=0,
as it applies to regime (I), we get uL = L ￿ LR ￿ LM = 0 because all
workers are fully employed either in R&D or in manufacturing. Otherwise,
employment in manufacturing is lower than under perfect labor reallocation.
Which of the two regimes (I) or (II) occurs depends on the parameter
values. Not surprisingly, two examples would be that the occurrence of
unemployment is more likely if frictions in labor reallocation are strong
and wages are high. Given the number of vacancies and the extent of
job destruction, frictions ￿ reduce the matching rate between job seekers
and jobs so that less jobless workers can enter new employments. High
wages reduce labor demand. The consequence is that a high ! increases






1￿￿ and V 0 < 0. The open economy can not
be clearly associated with either regime (I) or (II). However, since openness
to foreign innovations tends to increase job destruction, ongoing economic
integration can change the state of the economy from regime (I) to (II) if
labor reallocation is not perfectly organized.
143 Equilibrium Labor Allocation with Unemploy-
ment
Equilibrium labor allocation with constant LM and LR requires: First, from
continuous job creation and job destruction it follows that equal ￿ ows into
and out of jobs are necessary to ￿x the employment size. No further change
in total (un)employment occurs if U = (1 ￿ ￿)V as it has been shown in
the previous section. Second, it is necessary that both sectors o⁄er identical
income expectations to ￿x the sectoral labor allocation. Labor can be em-
ployed in either manufacturing or R&D and workers are free to move from
one to the other. Moves stop in equilibrium when both alternatives o⁄er the
same expected income. This means that wages in manufacturing are equal
to the expected return to R&D, which depends on the value of an innovation
and the probability of arrival. This state is denoted as the income identity
and yields w￿ = "J￿+1. The remainder of the section develops both condi-
tions as a function for the R&D intensity and shows how their combination
yields the solution of the model.
Equilibrium labor allocation demands that ￿ ows into and out of unem-
ployment are even. To formulate this condition we consider the labor market
identity with unemployment, L = LR + LM + uL, and use the right hand
side of (17) instead of uL. This results in:
EE: LR;h =
1 ￿ ￿





This is the employment equation EE showing those employment shares of
home R&D which yield the identity between job creation and job destruction
in regime (II). Here it is not competition of foreign R&D that reduces the
number of researchers at home, but foreign innovations contribute to home
job destruction and therefore lower the home employment base.
In addition to a constant rate of labor reallocation, no-arbitrage between
the sectors must hold. While manufacturing workers earn the wage w￿,
research workers receive no income unless their ￿rm innovates. Innovation
is stochastic and research workers get an expected income of "J￿+1 as a
15worker develops the next innovation ￿ + 1 at the probability ". As long as
the income identity w￿ = "J￿+1 holds, no sector attracts workers with the
prospect of a higher income. The income identity can also be written as an
expression of the parameters of the model and the relative labor shares of
the two sectors. We substitute J￿+1 as it arises in the income identity by
the value of an innovation according to (13), but with the future technology


























AE is the no-arbitrage equation, in which the equilibrium employment
shares of R&D and manufacturing even out the income alternatives.6 AE
shows again the demand and the opposing competition e⁄ect of openness.
Foreign manufacturing increases the ￿rst term of the RHS of AE, while for-
eign R&D act as a competitor for innovations and LR;f reduces the RHS of
AE. If economic integration ￿nally results in an increases (decreases) of the
RHS of AE, the open economy makes home R&D more (less) attractive in
comparison to the closed economy.
Equilibrium in regime (II) must take the ￿ ow identity according to EE
into account in addition to no-arbitrage according to AE. As there is no
unemployment EE can be omitted in regime (I) and the equilibrium is re-
duced to the AE and the simple labor market identity L = LM + LR. In
regime (I) with perfect labor reallocation, the actual size of LR and LM
follows from the magnitude of the total labor supply L. The labor market
identity implies that labor is fully employed in manufacturing and R&D.
This in AE yields the equilibrium number of employees in manufactur-
ing, which is a function of openness and foreign demand and competition,
L￿
M = f (￿f;h;￿h;f;LR;f;LM;f;￿). See Appendix for the explicit solution.
6 We assume that the home country is small which allows us to ignore responses of foreign
labor allocation to home labor allocation so that employment in foreign R&D, LR;f, and
foreign manufacturing, LM;f is ￿xed.
16The equilibrium number of researcher follows straightforward from subtract-
ing L￿
M from L.
Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration of the equilibrium in the LM;h;LR;h-
plane. The locus of AE starts right from the origin and slopes upwards. This
indicates that a manufacturing sector of large scale increases the returns
from innovations in R&D because of a broad market for the intermediate
good. Higher pro￿ts then attract more R&D units. Consequently, LR;h in-
creases with LM;h. The locus of EE is parallel to the horizontal axis. Its
distance from the axis is large if R&D has only small e⁄ects on job destruc-
tion. Hence, EE￿ which is located above EE represents an economy with
less imperfections in labor reallocation. The intersection of the loci AE and
EE establish equilibrium labor allocation with unemployment, from which
we obtain the size of LM and LR. The intersection of the two curves may
be right or left from the line of the labor market identity (the full employ-
ment case) L = LR + LM. The intersection is right from the line of labor
market identity (point A) if job creation exceeds job destruction. However,
this point is located outwards of the employment space and is therefore not
attainable. Point B will be realized instead. This represents the solution of
regime (I). However, labor supply is not fully engaged if EE intersects with
AE left from the line of the labor market identity, such as in C. The distance
between C and the line of the labor market identity yields the dimension
of unemployment. Less labor is employed in both sectors in comparison
to point B. This implies less output and a lower growth path because the
innovation rate gA;t = ln(￿)
P
j=h;f
￿h;j"jLR;j reduces with a low LR;h.
Some short considerations show the stability of the equilibrium. First,
the AE locus is stable. The space above the line corresponds to a relative
disadvantage in income from R&D. The consequent movement of workers
towards manufacturing causes a downward adjustment of LR;h and the em-
ployment combination approaches the AE locus. The process continues until
the income di⁄erences disappear and the employment ratio corresponds to
the one which follows from AE. If the adjustments takes place immediately,
as it is assumed in this type of models,7 the economy jumps to its equilib-
7 We refer here to the standard growth models with endogenous innovation in the tradition
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Figure 1: Equilibrium labor allocation
rium and remains there afterwards. Suppose furthermore that we start in a
point above the EE curve. In this case job destruction exceeds job creation
and unemployment increases. This leads to an adjustment downward and
to the left, for example along AE from B to C. From the two stable loci
follows that any equilibrium labor allocation, such as point C, is also stable
as long as the change of positions between the sectors can be easily made.
4 The E⁄ects of Economic Integration
Economic integration, here in terms of a higher degree of free technology
exchange (￿h;f, ￿f;h increase), has an impact on growth and labor realloca-
tion. On condition that job destruction exceeds job creation unemployment
can increase as a consequence of more openness to the foreign R&D. As in
Aghion and Howitt (1998, chap. 11), we can identify a direct and an indi-
rect e⁄ect of openness on growth. The scale e⁄ect is related to the range
of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
18of available R&D output which increases if foreign innovations can be used
to a larger extent. The reallocation e⁄ect considers changes in the labor
allocation if more openness augments the attractiveness of either R&D or
manufacturing in terms of a higher relative income and workers consequently
move from one sector to the other. If there is a gain for R&D, more inno-
vations will stimulate growth, but the opposite is true if expected revenues
from home R&D decline. The two e⁄ects imply that economic integration
includes two sources of technological and structural change. First, the intra-
sectoral composition of vintages in manufacturing changes if more openness
accelerates the emergence of new vintages. Second, the intersectoral distrib-
ution of labor may change if one sector realizes extra pro￿ts from economic
integration.
Table 1 reveals the possible e⁄ects of economic integration on employ-
ment and growth. Recall that regime (I) describes perfect labor reallocation
where job creation compensates for job destruction. In contrast to this,
regime (II) produces unemployment because job creation is lower than job
destruction. The results are also summarized in ￿ve implications which read
as follows:
Implication 1: The scale e⁄ect of economic integration on growth is posi-
tive in regime (I) but it disappears in regime (II).
As growth is a function of the weighted sum of the foreign and the domestic
R&D sectors, gA;t = ln(￿)
P
j=h;f
￿h;j"jLR;j, the pure increase in scale of total
available R&D output increases growth in regime (I) if the two economies
reduce their trade barriers (i.e. if ￿h;f, ￿f;h increase). In contrast to this,
in regime (II) foreign innovations crowd out domestically developed ones.
It follows from changes in the labor allocation according to EE that the
home R&D sector shrinks if there are more foreign competitors. EE in the
growth equation yields that gA = (1 ￿ ￿)=[(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)] in regime (II).
This means that there is no e⁄ect of openness left in regime (II). Hence,
economic integration is not accompanied by a scale e⁄ect that stimulates
growth. Instead, imperfections in the labor market determine gA and less
frictions in the labor reallocation lead to more growth. One can interpret
19this as a maximum of the absorptive capacity. Imperfections in the labor
market limit its ability to reallocate labor to the new vintages in manufactur-
ing. This means that the size of that part of manufacturing which demands
the technology update is limited and only a ￿xed number of technology up-
dates can be implemented in manufacturing. It is irrelevant whether these
technology updates come from home or foreign R&D units.
Implication 2: The scale e⁄ect of economic integration on employment is
negative in regime (II).
As soon as more foreign R&D output is available, the raise of the innovation
rate leads to more structural change, the reason for job destruction in the
economy. Given a constant sector allocation of labor, the equation for unem-
ployment in regime (II), see (17), shows that less workers will be employed if
￿h;f increases in an open economy. Openness increases job destruction but
leaves job creation unchanged.8 As a consequence, unemployment increases
further in the scenario with imperfect labor reallocation.
Implication 3: In regime (I), the reallocation e⁄ect of economic integra-
tion on growth is positive (negative) if the foreign economy has a low (high)
R&D intensity or if the foreign economy contributes to economic integration
more (less) than the home economy.
Economic integration is de￿ned as allocation neutral if more openness af-
fects only the vintage structure in manufacturing but leaves the relative
employment shares of R&D and manufacturing untouched. This is true if
the demand e⁄ect from foreign manufacturing is equal to the opposing com-
petition e⁄ect of foreign R&D so that the expected income from R&D does
not change. Otherwise, no-arbitrage between the sectors changes due to eco-
nomic integration. On condition that the no arbitrage equation AE changes,
openness ampli￿es or lessens the scale e⁄ect with respect to employment and
growth. The analysis of the equilibrium labor allocation L￿
M;L￿
R in regime
(I) yields that the employment share in home R&D increases with foreign
8 This result is in line with the empirical ￿ndings of Ribeiro et al. (2004) who analyzed the
e⁄ects of trade liberalization on labor reallocation in Brazil.
20and decreases with home openness, @L￿
R=@￿f;h > 0; @L￿
R=@￿h;f < 0.9 In a
situation where the countries contribute di⁄erently to economic integration,
(@￿f;h 6= @￿h;f), a relative high foreign openness tends to generate a altered
labor allocation with a higher R&D share of total employment. Generally,
more home innovations and growth are the consequence.
If both countries reduce their protectionism to the same extent, namely













On condition of (20), economic integration increases the expected income
from home R&D because the demand e⁄ect dominates the competition
e⁄ect. The demand for the domestic R&D output is large if there is a
broad market for technology updates because foreign manufacturing (LM;f)
is large. The foreign R&D sector is little competitive if "fLR;f is low. Hence,
the demand e⁄ect dominates the competition e⁄ect if the foreign country
is relatively little engaged in R&D which indicates a low ratio LR;f=LM;f.
On condition that the LHS of (20) is greater that the RHS, labor reallo-
cates from manufacturing to R&D and this generates more growth through
more home innovations. Otherwise, workers move towards manufacturing
which implies less future innovations and this outcome lowers the prospect
of growth.10
Implication 4: In regime (II), the reallocation e⁄ect of economic integra-
tion on employment is negative (positive) if the foreign economy has a low
(high) R&D intensity or if the foreign economy contributes to economic in-
tegration more (less) than the home economy.
An economy is highly engaged in R&D if the sector is highly productive.
This is accompanied by high job destruction and leads to unemployment in
regime (II). If economic integration reallocates labor further towards R&D,
9 See Appendix.
10 In Figure 1 the AE-curve shifts to the left (right) if economic integration is non-neutral
with respect to sector labor-allocation and brings relative advantages for R&D (manufac-
turing) income.
21the economy experiences even more job destruction in manufacturing and
unemployment increases further. This scenario is more likely if foreign R&D
is relative weak or if the foreign economy contributes more to economic in-
tegration when it opens the markets to foreign innovators whereas the home
country keeps its protective trade barriers. This means that the demand
e⁄ect dominates the competition e⁄ect and R&D becomes more attractive
for home workers. The higher revenues to R&D change the former equilib-
rium of no-arbitrage according to AE. However, since the absolute number
of R&D workers can not increase (their number is ￿xed according to EE),
the increase in the attractiveness of R&D results in a decline in manufactur-
ing in which less workers become employed. In contrast to this, employment
increases if openness leads to a labor reallocation towards manufacturing.
Implication 5: In regime (II), there is no reallocation e⁄ect of economic
integration on growth.
As growth is ￿xed to gA = (1 ￿ ￿)=[(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)] in regime (II), see Im-
plication 1, labor reallocation has no e⁄ect on innovation and growth. Labor
reallocation that favors R&D results in a relative increase in R&D employ-
ment. However, according to Implication 4, this happens through a reduc-
tion in manufacturing jobs. The share of workers employed in R&D increases
while its size in absolute numbers, and the R&D output, remain the same.
The bene￿ts of economic integration may be unequally distributed. Sup-
pose, for example, that both countries are in regime (I), but country one is
highly R&D intense, while country two is less. Caused by economic inte-
gration, the two countries then partly specialize in R&D and manufacturing
respectively. Country one experiences an extra push in growth from an equal
reduction of protectionism as home resources reallocate towards R&D and
increase R&D intensity further. In contrast to this, a reciprocal e⁄ect in
country two would lead to a reallocation towards manufacturing which is
less bene￿cial in terms of future growth. However, the low R&D intense
country two can avoid the loss of home innovation if it allows less in￿ ow of
technologies than country one, namely ￿1;2 > ￿2;1.
Another example would be that country one has strong frictions in the
22Table 1: The e⁄ects of integration
regime I regime II
growth growth employment
Scale e⁄ect + 0 -
Reallocation e⁄ect
low R&D intensity abroad + 0 -
high R&D intensity abroad - 0 +
￿h;f > ￿f;h - 0 +
￿f;h > ￿h;f + 0 -
+ = increase, - = decrease, 0 = no e⁄ect
labor market and is in regime (II), whereas country two manages a perfect
labor reallocation and is in regime (I). On this condition, country one expe-
riences no growth boost from more openness. Instead, economic integration
will cause negative employment e⁄ects through a higher pace of labor real-
location. This e⁄ect is the stronger the more the country is engaged in R&D
and the more protective the economy is (i.e. ￿1;2 < ￿2;1) because home re-
sources additionally move towards R&D and reinforce the labor reallocation
further.
5 Conclusions
In open economies, the knowledge about best practices and technologies
di⁄uses quickly across the borders and starts to change the prior domestic
technological and organizational solutions. Therefore, economic integration
of industrialized economies leads to more technological and structural change
which alters the interindustry and intraindustry resource allocation as soon
as more and more of the global available technologies are shared. While this
tends to be gainful in terms of productivity, the structural change is mostly
accompanied by a reallocation of resources, which often implies a turnover
of labor. If the reallocation can not be organized perfectly, some negative
23employment e⁄ects can emerge.
The empirical ￿ndings by Haltiwanger et al. (2004) suggest that trade
liberalization can result in a higher pace of labor reallocation and lower
employment levels. This paper provides a theoretical framework to explain
how openness and free technology exchange lead to structural change in
manufacturing accompanied by an increase in job destruction. The risk of a
decline in employment due to economic integration is high if the prior pace
of labor reallocation has been high and partly blocked by frictions. One can
argue that highly R&D intense economies already show a high rate of job
destruction. Consequently, these economies have a high risk of additional
job losses due to a free exchange of technologies.
The combination of endogenous technological change with job destruc-
tion and job creation has some implications for the generally assumed growth
e⁄ect of the removal of trade barriers. Labor markets, in which frictions lead
to only imperfect labor reallocation, withstand only a maximum of struc-
tural change. From this it follows that foreign innovations substitute for
home developments and, as the total technology pool remains the same,
economic integration is accompanied by less productivity gains as usually
expected.
24Appendix
Equilibrium labor allocation fL￿
M;L￿
Rg in regime (I) yields from substituting































From this it follows that di⁄erentiating (A.1) with respect to the level of
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LM;f > 0 (demand e⁄ect). (A.4)
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